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THE WIND PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT AND 
THE CASE FOR ENDING ALL ENERGY 
SUBSIDIES 
NICOLAS LORIS† 
In a New York Times article entitled “A New Era for Windmill 
Power,” journalist Matthew Wald writes,  
  A new generation of windmills that Don Quixote could never tilt 
at is ready to take its place as an economical and important source 
of the nation’s energy.  
  Because of striking improvements in technology, the commercial 
use of these windmills, or wind turbines as the builders call them, 
has shown that in addition to being pollution free, they can now 
compete with fossil fuels in the cost of producing electricity.1 
Although Wald’s article reads like it could be found in this 
morning’s New York Times, it was actually written in 1992—the same 
year Congress passed and President George Bush Sr. signed into law 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which provided a renewable-energy-
production tax credit, which has largely benefited wind companies 
and is now more commonly known as the wind production tax credit 
(wind PTC).2 The wind PTC was set to expire on December 31, 2012,3  
but was extended as part of the negotiations to avoid a combination 
of tax increases and government spending cuts.4  
The discussion over the wind PTC extension serves as a useful 
microcosm of the debate over energy subsidies in general. Proponents 
of the wind PTC and other energy subsidies argue that government 
support is essential to spur innovation, compensate for decades of 
 
 †   Nicolas Loris, an economist, focuses on energy, environmental and regulatory issues as 
the Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage Foundation. The author would like to 
thank Katie Tubb, Romina Boccia, David Kreutzer, Jack Spencer, and Duncan Goodwyn for 
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 1.  Matthew L. Wald, A New Era for Wind Power, N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 8, 1992, at C2, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/08/business/a-new-era-for-windmill-
power.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
 2.  Renewable Energy Production Incentive, Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 
13317a (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13317 (West 2005)). 
 3.  Producers that built windmills in 2012 would have  continued to receive the subsidy 
until 2022 because a producer is eligible to receive the subsidy for ten years after installation. 
 4.  American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–240, 126 Stat. at  2314, § 407. 
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conventional-fuel subsidies, compete with other nations, prepare for 
replacement of fossil fuel resources we are rapidly exhausting, and 
reduce global warming.5 Advocates argue that if the subsidy is not 
extended, the industry will atrophy and jobs would be lost.6 
Opponents respond that extending the wind PTC will not save 
the planet, replace conventional fuels, or lead America to energy 
independence. Instead, opponents argue that an extension of the 
wind PTC will perpetuate subsidization in the American energy 
sector and encourage technological stagnation by shifting resources 
away from productive use.7 This Article argues that Congress and the 
administration should work to remove all subsidies for all energy 
sources to transform our energy economy into a competitive, market-
oriented system. 
I. WHAT ARE SUBSIDIES? 
The general economic rule of thumb is that if you want less of 
something, tax it, and if you want more of something, subsidize it. 
Subsidies come in many shapes and sizes and are thus often difficult 
to define comprehensively. Direct spending, targeted tax credits, loan 
guarantees, production mandates, and policies that artificially lower 
the risk of an activity are all part of the energy-subsidy world. 
However, this is certainly not an all-encompassing list. The definition 
of a subsidy as a direct transfer of money to a group or industry is 
underinclusive. 
 While this Article will mostly examine one type of subsidy—the 
wind PTC—it will use the following broader definition of subsidy: 
Using the political process to support the production or consumption 
of one good over another. 
II. WHY SUBSIDIES ARE BAD ECONOMIC POLICY 
Subsidies are bad economic policy because they misallocate 
resources and reward political connectedness as opposed to sound 
economic ideas. In general, there are two types of companies that 
 
 5.  AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, THE AMERICAN WIND INDUSTRY URGES CONGRESS TO 
TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO PASS AN EXTENSION OF THE PTC (2012), available at 
http://www.awea.org/issues/federal_policy/upload/PTC-Fact-Sheet.pdf. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  DAVID E. DISMUKES, REMOVING BIG WIND’S “TRAINING WHEELS”: THE CASE FOR 
ENDING THE FEDERAL PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 5–6 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanenergyalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Dismukes-Removing-Big-
Winds-Training-Wheels.pdf. 
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receive subsidies. First, there are companies that receive subsidies 
because their technologies need help from the government and 
cannot compete economically without taxpayer support. Second, 
there are companies that would, and often do, receive investment 
from the private sector because their technology is profitable or 
because investors find their technology promising. In this second case, 
the subsidy partially offsets private-sector investments that would 
have been made without the subsidy, and taxpayer dollars pad the 
company’s bottom line. 
Government support that targets one industry or technology 
over another encourages technological stagnation. A special 
endorsement from the government gives one technology an unfair 
price advantage over other technologies, which reduces competition. 
Further, subsidies reduce the incentive for an industry to make their 
technology cost-competitive by encouraging dependence on 
preferential treatment provided by the government. 
The wind PTC is a perfect example of a technology’s continued 
dependence on subsidies. Although the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) set a clear end date for the wind 
PTC of December 31, 2012, the entire industry lobbied and 
successfully pushed through an extension.8 In an April 2013 column in 
The Wall Street Journal, Patrick Jenevein, CEO of the clean energy 
firm Tang Energy Group, acknowledged the problems with his own 
industry’s dependence on subsidies.9 Specifically, Jenevein stated, 
“Government subsidies to new wind farms have only made the 
industry less focused on reducing costs. In turn, the industry produces 
a product that isn’t as efficient or cheap as it might be if we focused 
less on working the political system and more on research and 
development.”10 
 This is no special vice of the wind industry—the same has been 
true of the ethanol industry and many other industries, which have 
also benefited from favorable treatment by the government. 
When the 2004 Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit was set to 
expire at the end of 2010, Congress extended the credit by another 
 
 8.  Raju Chebium, Wind Energy Has Small Slice of Energy Pie butBig Lobbying Push for 
Tax Credit, COLORADOAN.COM (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20121207/ 
NEWS01/312070013/Wind-energy-has-small-slice-energy-pie-big-lobbying-push-tax-credit.  
 9.  Patrick Jenevein, Wind-Power Subsidies? No Thanks., WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2013, at 
A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323501004578386501479255158 
.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop. 
 10.  Id. 
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year after the corn lobby pushed hard for an extension.11 Although 
the credit expired at the beginning of 2012, the corn lobby pushed and 
obtained tax credits for fueling infrastructure and advanced biofuels.12  
These special tax breaks benefit an industry that already has a 
guaranteed share of the fuel market. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
and the Energy Independence and Security Act extended a 
Renewable Fuel Standard that requires the United States to blend 
thirty-six billion gallons of ethanol into gasoline by 2022.13 The 
industry’s continual clinging to taxpayer-funded handouts is a result 
of receiving the initial tax credit, as evidenced by the boom and bust 
of the wind industry when the tax credit expired and then was 
reinstated.14 Special carve-outs encourage industry complacency and 
dependence on government support. 
Another destructive feature of subsidies is that they allow the 
federal government to direct the flow of private-sector investments. 
Direct expenditures, targeted tax breaks, loan guarantees, and other 
government subsidies allocate resources away from more competitive 
projects. For example, if the government gives a tax credit to banana 
producers only, it shifts labor and capital towards banana production 
and away from other economic activities, like strawberry or grape 
production. 
In effect, by politically picking winners, subsidies crowd out 
investment and make it difficult for new technologies that do not 
receive a government handout to enter the market.15 The market, and 
not politicians in Washington, is well-suited for determining how to 
allocate resources to meet consumer demand. When a firm minimizes 
costs, the firm maximizes profit by maximizing value to the consumer. 
Subsidies significantly distort that process. 
 
 11.  Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
H.R. 4853, 111th Cong. § 708(d) (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/ 
hr4853. 
 12.  Kirsten Korosec, Why the Anti-Tax Lobby Saved Corn Ethanol—For Now, 
CBSNEWS.COM (June 15, 2011, 7:53 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-
43045595/why-the-anti-tax-lobby-saved-corn-ethanol—for-now/. 
 13.  Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.); Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, 121 
Stat. 1492 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 14.  AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 5. 
 15.  See Chung-Lei Yang, Rent Seeking, Technology Commitment, and Economic 
Development, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 640, 653–55 (1998) (discussing 
market inefficiencies resulting from subsidies). 
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Subsidies also make for poor economic policy because they 
politicize the economic process by allowing the federal government to 
highly influence decisions and investments. Industries that stand to 
benefit from subsidies concentrate more effort into lobbying for the 
subsidies and for preventing competitors from receiving similar 
handouts. Banana producers push for tax-credit extensions; in 
response, apple producers complain that they are at a disadvantage 
and lobby for their own handouts. 
Companies and politicians both stand to profit from this perverse 
system. Taxpayer-funded subsidies create a system of cronyism 
between government and industry. The process can be (albeit 
simplistically) described as playing out in roughly three steps. First, 
Industry X hires lobbyists to meet with Congressman Smith and tell 
him that if he moves the subsidy legislation into law, Industry X will 
build the plant in Congressman Smith’s district. Second, Congressman 
Smith says to his constituents and his state that his hard efforts 
brought jobs and economic growth, which certainly cannot hurt come 
re-election time. It also does not hurt that Industry X is contributing 
to Congressman Smith’s campaign. Third, Congressman Smith wins 
re-election, and both he and Industry X clamor that the subsidy’s 
expiration will hurt the local economy because Industry X will face 
layoffs. This process typically results in Industry X securing an 
extension of the subsidy and Congressman Smith holding onto his 
seat in Congress. 
This tendency of the political process to continually pick winners 
and losers was first identified by economist Gordon Tullock16 and 
later defined by economist Anne Krueger as “rent-seeking.”17 Its 
greatest costs result from distorting economic activity. The resources 
a banana producer used for lobbying for banana tariffs or an 
extension of the banana tax credit could have been spent actually 
growing and selling bananas. Rather than engaging in profit-seeking 
behavior in the marketplace, the producer is engaging in rent-seeking 
behavior in the political process. Thus, the more the government 
becomes involved in making economic decisions that are best left to 
the private sector, the higher the perverse incentive to lobby. While 
this does create a few lobbyist jobs, much consumer value is lost. 
 
 16. See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 
W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
 17.  Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 
291 (1974). 
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Economist Russell Sobel of West Virginia University defines 
rent-seeking as unproductive entrepreneurship.18 Political efforts 
made by rent-seeking companies could have been channeled toward 
productive uses instead of distorting economic activity.19 Sobel found 
that states that provide more political preferences have higher levels 
of unproductive entrepreneurship and lower levels of productive 
entrepreneurship, and therefore have slower economic growth.20 
Conversely, reducing government control of the energy economy 
reduces the incentive to use the political process for gain. While rent-
seeking activity occurs in many sectors of the economy, the debate 
over the wind PTC extension provides an excellent example. 
Although clamoring from the wind industry for an extension of the 
subsidy occurred for all of 2012 until Congress passed an extension,21 
it is important to put much of this clamoring into context for future 
debates on energy subsidies. 
III. REFUTING COMMON CLAIMS FOR JUSTIFICATION OF THE WIND 
PTC 
Advocates for extending the wind PTC often argue that without 
an extension, the industry will lose jobs, America will move further 
away from energy diversity and towards dependence on foreign oil, 
and the planet will continue to warm.22 However, such arguments are 
narrow and short-sighted, ignoring economic, energy-supply, and 
global-climate realities. 
A. The Only Jobs Lost Are Those Propped Up by the Taxpayer 
An enticing and attractive argument for the wind industry to 
make, especially in a recessionary economic environment, is that jobs 
will be lost with the subsidy’s expiration. This argument, however, 
could apply to just about any sector of the economy. Take VHS or 
videotape producers, for example. Imagine the VHS industry writing 
this letter to Congress: 
VHS has been a staple of the American way of watching television 
and movies. VHS has supported countless manufacturing jobs, and 
even though there are better products out there, let’s face it: we 
 
 18.  Russell Sobel, Testing Baumol: Institutional Quality and the Productivity of 
Entrepreneurship, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 641, 646 (2008). 
 19.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 648. 
 21.  Chebium, supra note 8. 
 22.  See, e.g., AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 5. 
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need a variety of ways to watch our programs. The states and local 
economies that have VHS production facilities have experienced 
and benefited from VHS production, but without a little help from 
the taxpayers, jobs will be lost and the industry will atrophy. VHS 
production has bipartisan support, will be good for American 
manufacturing jobs, and will diversify our program-watching 
ability. America needs VHS, and VHS needs the taxpayers’ help. 
Windmills are no different than VHS tapes. The argument that, 
without extending the PTC, domestic energy production and 
American jobs will be lost is an equally flawed line of economic 
reasoning. The history of the wind PTC makes this point clear. 
Congress first passed the PTC in 1992 but allowed it to expire several 
times.23 The PTC expired in 2000, 2002, and 2004, and annual wind 
installation decreased by 93 percent, 73 percent, and 77 percent, 
respectively.24 Wind energy advocates call this a boom-and-bust cycle 
created by unstable policy,25 but it is more likely a case of the wind 
PTC’s oversupplying a market and artificially propping up a large 
portion of wind production. Predictably, in response to the looming 
expiration date, extending the wind PTC had bipartisan support. In 
fact, two Republican governors sent a letter similar to the 
hypothetical VHS letter to the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, urging them to pass the wind PTC extension.26  
The Republican governors’ letter cites a study by the economic 
consulting firm Navigant that estimates nearly half the wind jobs will 
be lost if Congress fails to act.27 With enough taxpayer dollars, 
America can prop up just about any industry, even VHS, but that 
does not mean those jobs are adding value and growing the economy. 
If Navigant’s numbers are accurate, they indicate that the PTC 
subsidy has shifted labor and capital away from other, more 
productive sectors of the economy and towards wind.28 Moreover, it 
shows that the entire wind industry will not disappear with the PTC, 
 
 23.  Renewable Energy Production Incentive, Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 
13317a (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13317 (West 2005)). 
 24. AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 5. 
 25.  AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT (2012), available at 
http://awea.org/issues/federal_policy/upload/PTC_April-2011.pdf. 
 26.  Letter from Terry E. Brandstad, Governor, & Sam Brownback, Governor, to 
Conference Committee Members (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://www.awea.org/newsroom/ 
pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=13871. 
 27.  Id. (citing NAVIGANT CONSULTING INC., IMPACT OF THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 
ON THE U.S. WIND MARKET 24 (2011), available at http://www.awea.org/_cs_upload/learnabout/ 
publications/reports/12538_3.pdf). 
 28.  See id. (showing increased wind jobs during period of PTC). 
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indicating that some wind energy can compete in the electricity 
market without subsidies. The sector of the wind industry that does 
remain will be the healthier, robust part—the part that sells an 
economically viable product without the subsidy. 
B. We Are Not Running Out of Fossil Fuels and Even if We Were, So 
What? 
Another common justification for energy subsidies is that the 
United States has a limited amount of fossil-fuel resources and that 
domestically produced wind energy will put America on the track to 
energy independence. This is a shortsighted and unconvincing 
argument. 
First, America has an abundance of domestic conventional-fuel 
resources. Coal is the single largest electricity source in America; for 
years, it is has been used for nearly half of all domestic electricity 
generation.29 With 497 billion tons of recoverable domestic 
resources—enough to provide electricity in North America for 500 
years at current consumption rates—coal has the potential to be a 
useful energy resource long into the future.30 
Further, natural gas is taking on more of a role in the energy 
sector. North America has approximately 4.2 quadrillion (4244 
trillion) cubic feet of recoverable natural gas, which would satisfy 175 
years’ worth of consumption at current rates.31 The price of domestic 
natural gas is currently so low that companies have largely stopped 
drilling for dry-gas-only wells and instead are drilling where they can 
find wet gas or a combination of oil and gas.32 
It is also useful to stress that these estimates are far from 
definitive. The history of global oil reserves, for example, provides a 
valuable lesson for believers of imminent resource exhaustion. Three 
decades ago, proven oil reserves were 645 billion barrels; five years 
ago, reserves were 1.28 trillion barrels; and in 2009, reserves increased 
 
 29.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRICITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states. 
 30.  INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY INVENTORY 16–17 
(2011), available at http://www.energyforamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Energy-
InventoryFINAL.pdf. 
 31.  Id. at 9. 
 32. Mark Passwaters, Massive Shift to Liquids Under Way, But Analysts Say It May Not 
Move Gas Prices, SNL FIN. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www2.snl.com/Interactivex/ 
article.aspx?CdId=A-14173382-12848. 
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to 1.34 trillion barrels.33 Even as the world consumes more oil than 
ever before, innovative technologies have helped discover and extract 
more crude oil. Meanwhile, the technological one-two punch of 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has led to extraction of 
new reserves, tapping into areas where oil and gas recovery was 
previously thought to be uneconomical.34 
Simply because the United States has these resources underneath 
its soil does not mean that they must be used. If another energy 
source is more affordable, then coal and natural gas can stay in the 
ground. If America were depleting its conventional fuels, it would be 
good news for wind proponents. Decreasing supplies of fossil fuels 
would drive up their price and make alternative power generation 
more economical. Price signals would trigger investments in 
competing technologies, and technologies that could provide lower-
cost electricity would capture more of the market. 
Additionally, there are competing uses for electricity-generating 
resources. For instance, not only does natural gas provide over thirty 
percent of America’s electricity generation, but it also serves as 
feedstock for fertilizers, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, and is used 
for waste treatment, food processing, fueling industrial boilers, and 
much more.35 There is a profound complexity in producers’ 
preference for selling their resources to those who are willing to pay 
more because they value the resource more. That complexity should 
not be manipulated or distorted by politicians; the market is a much 
better arbiter of how resources are best allocated. 
Importantly, the demand for electricity is, for the most part, 
stable. Although businesses and consumers may use less electricity 
during a recession, overall demand persists.36 The global market for 
electricity is a multi-trillion dollar market that continues to grow.37 
 
 33. Energy Solutions for America–The Heritage Foundation, THE LIBRE INITIATIVE,  
http://www.thelibreinitiative.com/public/energy-solutions-for-america-the-heritage-foundation-
373.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 34.  Scott Tong, The Oil Man Who Figured Out Fracking, MARKETPLACE (Dec. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/oil-man-who-figured-out-fracking. 
 35.  Uses in Industry, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/uses_ 
industry.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
 36.  NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., 2009 SUMMER RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/summer2009.pdf. 
 37.  See FATIH BIROL, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, POWER TO THE PEOPLE: THE 
WORLD OUTLOOK FOR ELECTRICITY INVESTMENT (2004), available at http://www.iaea.org/ 
Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull461/power_to_the_people.html (explaining that world 
electricity demand is projected to double between 2000 and 2030). 
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The resource that can provide the most value to the consumer will 
certainly have its place in it. 
C. The Futility of Politicized Energy Independence 
Eliminating American dependence on foreign oil—making the 
United States “energy independent”—is a popular notion that 
politicians on both sides of the aisle love to invoke. Yet, campaigning 
for more renewable energy such as wind and solar to replace foreign 
oil is a non sequitur. Wind and solar energy are used for electricity 
generation. Since oil generates less than one percent of America’s 
electricity,38 it is misleading to suggest that wind and solar generation 
would affect oil consumption. 
U.S. electricity is largely supplied by domestic sources, and those 
energy resources that the United States does import come from a 
diversity of suppliers, many of which are friendly allies. In 2011, 42 
percent of U.S. electricity generation came from coal, 19 percent from 
nuclear, 25 percent from natural gas, and 13 percent from renewable 
sources, the majority of which come from hydroelectric power.39 Most 
of the coal that the United States does import (only one percent of 
total consumption) comes from Colombia,40 and 90 percent of the 
imported natural gas comes from Canada, with much of the rest 
coming from Trinidad.41  Out of the 2,472 billion cubic feet of natural 
gas consumed in December 2012 in the United States, only 3.7 
percent came from net imports.42 The United States also imports most 
of its uranium from Canada and Australia.43 Oil is a different story. 
The country’s three single biggest oil suppliers are Canada, Saudi 
Arabia, and Mexico.44 
 
 38.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HOW MUCH OF OUR ELECTRICITY IS GENERATED 
FROM RENEWABLE ENERGY? (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/ 
renewable_electricity.cfm. 
 39. Id. 
 40.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COAL EXPLAINED, COAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
(2012), available at  http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_imports. 
 41. Id.; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS IMPORTS BY COUNTRY (2012), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_m.htm. 
 42.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS: MONTHLY SUPPLY AND 
DISPOSITION BALANCE (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_sum_sndm_ 
s1_m.htm. 
 43.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., URANIUM MARKETING ANNUAL REPORT (2012), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/. 
 44.   U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM & OTHER LIQUIDS: WEEKLY 
PRELIMINARY CRUDE IMPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (2013), available at 
hhttp://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_wimpc_s1_w.htm. 
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Nevertheless, energy independence is not an appropriate policy 
goal. Oil is a global commodity, and whether the United States is a 
net importer or net exporter has little bearing on insulating 
Americans from price volatility. For comparison, even though the 
United States is self-sufficient in food production, domestic prices are 
affected by supply problems in other parts of the world.45 
Energy independence makes for a catchy sound-bite, but it 
should not be the goal of energy policy. The biggest threat to 
America’s reliable and affordable energy comes in the form of 
domestic government interventions that artificially raise or lower 
prices and distort market investments through unnecessary 
regulations, subsidies, preferential tax treatment, and other market-
distorting policies. 
America’s largely market-based energy policies have historically 
provided the nation with abundant and affordable energy resources.46 
When prices have spiked, government solutions more often than not 
made things worse. Unfortunately, an upward trajectory of 
government intervention through regulations, subsidies, mandates, 
and protections is threatening previous success. Americans will 
continue to be best served by energy markets that are free, 
competitive, and open. Ensuring that such energy markets are free, 
competitive, and open should be the main focus of American energy 
policy. 
D. No Impact on Climate Change 
If the United States has a robust, diverse energy supply, why 
subsidize a number of energy technologies? One ostensible reason is 
to reduce the nation’s carbon footprint. Reducing global warming is 
much of the motivation behind subsidizing carbon-free sources of 
energy or establishing a price on greenhouse-gas emissions, either by 
means of a carbon tax or through a cap-and-trade system that creates 
a cap on greenhouse-gas emissions and allows emitters to sell permits 
they accumulate if they are under the cap.47 
 
 45.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RECENT INCREASE IN FOOD 
COMMODITY PRICES 5 (2008), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/biomass/pdfs/ 
global_agricultural_supply_and_demand.pdf. 
 46. See The History of Regulation, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/ 
regulation/history.asp (last visited April 9, 2013) (deregulating natural gas and ending federal 
price controls helped encourage economic development). 
 47.  What is EPA Doing About Climate Change?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities.html (last updated Apr. 22, 2013). 
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However, the problem with discussing climate change begins 
with the way politicians and the media on both sides of the aisle talk 
about the issue and sensationalize it to energize and motivate their 
respective supporters. Arguments that human activity has nothing to 
do with climate change or that the planet is experiencing catastrophic 
warming are neither truthful nor useful to the debate.  
But not long ago, scientists thought that global cooling was a 
threat to the planet. As recently as 1975, Newsweek ran an article 
titled, “The Cooling World.”48 Some proposals mentioned by 
climatologists in the Newsweek article included covering the polar ice 
caps with black soot to melt them.49 
Almost all climatologists and respected scientists in the climate-
change community agree that carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases are warming agents.50 That agreement, however, 
does not come close to settling the scientific debate about the 
magnitude of climate change, the driving forces behind climate 
change, and the amount of warming projected from increased 
greenhouse-gas emissions. For instance, Harvard astrophysicist, Sallie 
Baliunus, and astronomer, Willie Soon, identify solar activity as the 
driving force behind climate change.51 Richard Lindzen, professor of 
meteorology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, notes that 
mainstream climate models fail to take into account naturally 
occurring cycles such as El Niño, the Pacific decadal oscillation, or the 
Atlantic multidecadal oscillation.52  
Nor does this general agreement that greenhouse gases are a 
warming agent tell us how much increasing greenhouse-gas emissions 
will contribute to sea-level rise. Even the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s projection of sea-level rise over the next century is 
 
 48.  Peter Gwynne, The Cooling World, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 28, 1975, at 64. 
 49.  Id. (“[Scientists] concede that some of the more spectacular solutions proposed, such 
as melting the arctic ice cap by covering it with black soot or diverting arctic rivers, might create 
problems far greater than those they solve.”) 
 50.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: TECHNICAL SUMMARY 21 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf. 
 51.  SALLIE BALIUNAS & WILLIE SOON, CLIMATE HISTORY AND THE SUN 11 (2001). 
 52.  Richard S. Lindzen, Op-Ed, The Climate Science Isn’t Settled, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 
2009), available at  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703939404574567423917025 
400.html. 
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a modest seven to twenty-three inches, with the lower end of that 
projection more likely to occur by the end of the century.53 
Moreover, universal agreement that CO2 is a warming agent does 
not imply that the United States or the entire planet is going to 
experience more extreme droughts, heat waves, or other natural 
disasters. University of Alabama climatologist John Christy’s recent 
testimony on this issue emphasizes that climate extremes, like the 
recent drought, will continue to occur with or without anthropogenic 
warming.54 
When discussing CO2, it is important to first remember that CO2 
is a colorless, odorless gas that does not have direct adverse health 
effects unless inhaled at extremely high concentrations.55 In other 
words, unlike black carbon or soot, it is a misnomer to label CO2 as a 
pollutant. Policymakers typically only discuss the social cost of CO2. 
They hardly ever discuss whether more CO2 in the atmosphere could 
also create a positive externality or whether the benefits from living 
in a warmer world could outweigh the costs of CO2 as a negative 
externality. A plethora of peer-reviewed literature explains that there 
are benefits from more CO2 in our atmosphere, such as plant growth, 
human longevity, seed enrichment, and decreased soil erosion as a 
result of more robust tree root growth.56 
If the scientific community unanimously agreed that the Earth is 
warming at an unsustainable rate, policymakers and climatologists 
would need to act quickly and thoughtfully together. Yet the current 
proposed and implemented solutions, whether they involve building 
more wind turbines with renewable-energy subsidies, biofuel 
 
 53.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 13–14 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf. 
 54.  The American Energy Initiative: A Focus on H.R. 6172: Hearing on H.R. 6172 Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Energy & Power, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of John R. Christy, 
Professor of Atmospheric Science, The University of Alabama in Huntsville), available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/E
P/20120920/HHRG-112-IF03-WState-ChristyJ-20120920.pdf. 
 55. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DOCUMENTATION FOR IMMEDIATELY 
DANGEROUS TO LIFE OR HEALTH CONCENTRATIONS (IDLHS) (1994), available at  
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/124389.html. 
 56. See, e.g., Enhanced or Impaired?, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF CARBON DIOXIDE & 
GLOBAL CHANGE, http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/health/ch3.php (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2013) (discussing CO2’s positive effect on food quantity and quality); SCI. & PUB. POLICY 
INST., THE MANY BENEFITS OF ATMOSPHERIC CO2 ENRICHMENT (2011), available at 
http://scienceandpublicpolicy.org/images/stories/papers/other/55_benefits_of_co2_pamphlet.pdf 
(discussing CO2’s positive effect on air pollution, food production, biodiversity, and other 
issues). 
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mandates, cap-and-trade systems, or carbon taxes, will have a 
negligible impact on the climate while imposing certain significant 
costs on quality of life and the economy. 
E. Unilateral Emissions Reductions Fail To Reduce Global Warming 
Some countries’ unilateral reduction of their greenhouse-gas 
emissions will do next to nothing to reduce global temperatures. So, 
whether one believes that the Earth is headed toward climate 
catastrophe or that the Earth is gradually warming, there is nearly 
universal agreement that an all-out carbon-cutting policy in the 
United States would do very little to moderate global warming.57 
Even if the United States were to curb carbon emissions eighty-three 
percent below 2005 levels by 2050 (what cap-and-trade legislation 
called for), it would only reduce global temperatures by two-tenths of 
a degree Celsius by the close of the century.58 Subsidizing wind 
production with the PTC and other carbon-free sources of energy 
would have even less of an effect, as those policies would not be 
enough to reach the U.S. cap-and-trade emissions target. 
However, a common argument for unilateral reduction of 
greenhouse-gas emissions is that if the United States leads, the rest of 
the world will follow. Although future CO2 emissions will likely come 
overwhelmingly from the developing world, these countries show 
little appetite for squeezing economic growth for uncertain climate 
outcomes.59 Despite actions taken by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to regulate CO2 emissions in the United States, the 
developing world has yet to follow suit and it plans for massive 
expansion of coal consumption.60 China surpassed the United States 
as the largest CO2 emitter in 2006.
61 By 2009 (the most recent year for 
 
 57. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Envtl. & Pub. Works, Jackson Confirms EPA 
Chart Showing No Effect on Climate Without China, India (July 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.PressReleases&ContentRec
ord_id=564ed42f-802a-23ad-4570-3399477b1393.  
 58.  Chip Knappenberger, Climate Impacts of Waxman-Markey (Part II), MASTER RES. 
(May 7, 2009), http://www.masterresource.org/2009/05/part-ii-a-climate-analysis-of-the-waxman-
markey-climate-bill%e2%80%94what-if-the-world-played-along. 
 59.  Alex Morales & Kim Chipman, China, EU Comments Show Reduced Scope of UN 
Climate Talks, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-
28/china-joins-eu-to-scale-back-outlook-for-un-climate-talks.html. 
 60.  Ailun Yang & Yiyum Cui, Global Coal Risk Assessment: Data Analysis and Market 
Research 7–9 (World Res. Inst., Working Paper, Nov. 2012), available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/global_coal_risk_assessment.pdf. 
 61. China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions,  N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html?_r=0. 
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which information is available), China’s emissions were forty-five 
percent higher than America’s.62 Other developing countries are also 
rapidly increasing their emissions as they develop their economies 
and expand their power base. According to a recent report from the 
World Resources Institute, 59 different countries plan to build nearly 
1200 coal-fired power plants, totaling over 1.4 million megawatts.63 
China and India alone account for 76 percent of the proposals.64 
Developing countries not only want access to cheap, reliable 
electricity, but they also have other, more urgent concerns than global 
warming. It is simply naïve to assume that these countries will follow 
the United States’ lead and curb economic growth to reduce 
greenhouse-gas emissions. Demanding CO2 emissions reductions 
from developing countries is immoral, and developing countries have 
much more pressing environmental concerns that should rightly take 
priority, such as gaining access to clean air and clean drinking water.  
China has a serious smog problem that is not a result of CO2 and is 
now even affecting Japan.65 Nearly thirty-eight million Indians suffer 
from a water-borne disease annually.66 Furthermore, millions of 
people in these countries are without electricity, and yet the West 
wants them to curb their energy use or demands that they build 
expensive, intermittent energy capacity.67 In July of 2012, India made 
headlines for the largest blackout in history, which left over 300 
million without electricity.68 Initial reports suggested that the blackout 
affected over 600 million people but omitted one key fact: many of 
India’s residents never had access to electricity in the first place.69 
 
 62.  See Millennium Development Goals Indicators, UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIV., 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749 (last updated July 2, 2012). 
 63.  Yang & Cui, supra note 60, at 5. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See Suffocating Smog from China Reaches Regions of Japan, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 5, 
2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/02/05/2003554261 (discussing air 
pollution’s carry-over effect on Japan). 
 66.  INDIRA KHURANA & ROMIT SEN, WATERAID, DRINKING WATER QUALITY IN RURAL 
INDIA: ISSUES AND APPROACHES 4 (2009), available at http://www.wateraid.org/~/media/ 
Publications/drinking-water-quality-rural-india.pdf. 
 67.  See DAVID JACOBS ET AL., WORLD FUTURE COUNCIL, UNLEASHING RENEWABLE 
ENERGY POWER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/fileadmin/user_upload/_Media/REPfund_DEC_09.pdf 
(explaining how difficult it is to get financing for renewable energy technologies in developing 
countries because of the very small profit margins). 
 68.  Tripti Lahiri, How Many People Actually Lost Power?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2012, 5:06 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2012/08/01/how-many-people-actually-lost-power-in-
india. 
 69.  Id. 
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These countries are not going to restrict their energy use to reduce 
greenhouse-gas emissions when they are still struggling towards 
providing the basic amenities of modern life for their people. Nor 
should they. 
F. The Seen and the Unseen Market Distortions 
Proponents of the wind PTC only take into account the visible 
effects of this policy. They highlight the jobs of manufacturers 
assembling windmills and pouring cement for the platforms.70 They 
emphasize the increasing role of wind in America’s electricity 
portfolio which reduces the amount of coal America burns.71 What 
proponents routinely ignore is the fact that the billions of dollars 
provided in subsidies do not fall freely from the sky; the federal 
government either borrows money from the American public or taxes 
the American public to pay for the subsidies. Simply put, taxpayer-
funded programs do not create jobs; they shift them from one sector 
of the economy to another. The opportunity costs, or the unseen 
effects of government spending, are the lost labor and capital 
extracted from other sectors of the economy to artificially support the 
politically preferred ones.72 In this case, the people and components 
needed to sell wind electricity cannot simultaneously be used to build 
automobiles, washing machines, or sidewalks. By distorting economic 
activity, wind subsidies are actually a net drain on the economy. 
One common claim touted by wind lobbyists is that wind energy 
creates more jobs per kilowatt hour than do conventional sources of 
energy.73 By that reasoning, we could replace all of the world’s 
mechanized agriculture equipment and give farmers shovels, hoes, 
and picks. That would certainly create jobs, but it would also 
significantly reduce productivity. If we can produce more energy with 
less labor, that frees up human resources to be productive elsewhere 
in the economy. 
French economist Frédéric Bastiat often discussed the seen and 
unseen effects of decisions in the marketplace. In an 1850 essay, 
Bastiat wrote: 
 
 70.  See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, supra note 5 (emphasizing the jobs that are created or 
saved by the wind PTC).   
 71.  Wind Works, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/windworks/ (last visited Apr. 9, 
2013). 
 72.  See supra Part II. 
 73.   Electricity from the Wind . . . Economic Development for Rural Communities, NEB. 
ENERGY Q. (Apr. 2004), http://www.neo.ne.gov/neq_online/april2004/apr2004.01.htm. 
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In the department of economy, an act, a habit, an institution, a law, 
gives birth not only to an effect, but to a series of effects. Of these 
effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests itself simultaneously 
with its cause—it is seen. The others unfold in succession—they are 
not seen: it is well for us, if they are foreseen. Between a good and a 
bad economist this constitutes the whole difference—the one takes 
account of the visible effect; the other takes account both of the 
effects which are seen, and also of those which it is necessary to 
foresee.74 
The wind PTC has had both seen and unseen effects on the economy. 
Unfortunately, too many people have not noticed the unseen effects. 
Wind subsidies impose a number of costs on the economy. Not 
only do the subsidies have direct costs in terms of billions of spent 
taxpayer dollars,75 but the PTC has distorting effects on the wholesale 
electricity market. Setting aside the fact that wind fails to be prevalent 
when electricity demand is most needed (when was the last time the 
wind was blowing consistently hard during a heat wave?),76 wind 
producers can actually bid to sell their energy for less than what it 
costs to produce and still earn a profit because the PTC is so 
generous.77 In effect, wind producers can bid negatively to supply 
their power because of the subsidy. 
Power producers compete against one another to sell electricity 
to the grid. When selling electricity to grid operators, wind suppliers 
can underbid other electricity producers in times of excess supply, pay 
utilities to take their power, and still collect the $22 per megawatt 
hour generated from the tax credit.78 This is a perfect example of rent-
seeking, in which the rent is so profitable that it makes more sense for 
wind producers to lobby for the subsidy rather than attempt to sell 
their product for earned profit. 
 
 74.  FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, That Which Is Seen, and That Which Is Not Seen, in THE 
BASTIAT COLLECTION 1 (Ludwig von Mises Inst. ed., 2007), available at 
https://mises.org/books/bastiat1.pdf. 
 75. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE 
CHAIRMAN’S MARK AS MODIFIED TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE “FAMILY AND BUSINESS TAX 
CUT CERTAINTY ACT OF 2012,” SCHEDULED FOR MARK UP BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
FINANCE ON AUG. 2, 2012, JCX-70-12 (Comm. Print 2012), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/JCX.pdf. 
 76.  See Jonathan A. Lesser, Wind Intermittency and the Production Tax Credit: A High 
Cost Subsidy for Low Value Power, CONT’L ECON. at EX-1 (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.continentalecon.com/publications/cebp/Lesser_PTC_Report_Final_October-
2012.pdf (“In all three regions, over 84% of the installed wind generation infrastructure fails to 
produce electricity when electric demand is greatest.”). 
 77.  Id. at 2. 
 78.  Id. 
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Although wind companies selling their power more cheaply to 
the grid sounds attractive to electricity consumers, these sales have 
short- and long-term adverse implications on the electricity market. 
In the short run, integrating an intermittent, low-value source, such as 
wind, into the power grid in place of a more reliable energy source 
makes life difficult for grid operators who are constantly trying to 
balance supply and demand.79 To compensate for the irregularity and 
uncertainty of wind-powered electricity, wholesale operators must 
increase the amount of readily available backup power from 
conventional sources.80 The operational costs are spread among the 
ratepayers.81 
If wind generation were competitive in the marketplace without 
subsidies, then the market would adjust to wind energy’s particular 
operating conditions. Wind’s intermittency and the fact that more 
wind production may displace other types of electricity generation are 
not reasons to prevent the construction of wind turbines. The cause 
for concern is instead the government’s intervention into electricity 
generation, which inevitably causes market distortions. If, after 
accounting for all the costs (such as backup generation and the 
transmission lines necessary to bring wind energy from remote 
locations to where the power is needed), wind is price competitive, 
then it will have its place in the electricity sector. 
A good or service belongs in the marketplace when the value of 
the output is greater than the value of the input and when the output 
satisfies a consumer need. Subsidies reverse this by artificially 
reducing the costs of inputs to make the output value of wind more 
competitive, thus disguising the real cost and value of wind. If 
ratepayers value and demand wind energy, and if enough ratepayers 
are willing to pay a premium for that electricity, then the market will 
respond and provide it. Or, if the cost of wind technology decreases 
and the price of conventional energy increases, more wind electricity 
may enter the energy sector. The signals of profits and losses 
determine what adds economic value and should determine the 
extent of wind’s role in our country’s energy mix. 
 
 79.  See id. at Ex-2, Ex-3 (explaining how wind blows the least when electricity is needed 
most in the summer and how the most efficient energy resources produce electricity when they 
are called on). 
 80.  Id. at 18–19.   
 81.  Id.  
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IV. THE PATH FORWARD TO REMOVING MARKET DISTORTIONS 
The debate over the wind PTC extension provides a timely look 
into the economically destructive nature of energy subsidies. Energy 
subsidies extend far beyond the wind PTC. Coal, natural gas, oil, and 
renewable energy sources all enjoy preferential treatment at the 
taxpayer’s expense. Congress should make it a priority to prevent any 
new subsidization of energy sources and technologies. Congress 
should also peel back the subsidies that are currently in place. Forcing 
sunsets on preferential tax credits and offsetting the tax increases with 
lower tax rates for all businesses (such as a lower corporate income 
tax rate) would improve the tax code and lead to better energy policy. 
A. Prevent and Remove Direct Spending 
Direct energy expenditures in the United States have grown, 
largely because of the over $40 billion awarded to the Department of 
Energy (DOE) from the ARRA, also known as the stimulus bill.82 Of 
that amount, $16.8 billion went to the Office of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy.83 Additionally, the DOE spends billions of dollars 
to fund applied-research programs through its yearly budget process. 
Another DOE program that the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) lists as a direct expenditure is the Low Income Home Energy 
Assistance Program (LIHEAP).84 To prevent more direct government 
market distortions in the energy sector and to thus prevent wasting 
taxpayer dollars, Congress should prohibit funding for new subsidies, 
eliminate government programs that commercialize technologies, and 
eliminate federal programs for low-income energy assistance. 
1. Prohibit any new funding 
Congress should ensure that no taxpayer dollars go directly to 
energy production, storage, efficiency, infrastructure, or 
transportation for non-government consumers. While these types of 
projects may be important, they are better financed through the 
 
 82.   Agency Profile: Department of Energy, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/ 
Transparency/RecoveryData/Pages/AgencyProfile.aspx?agency_code=89 (last visited Mar. 25, 
2013). 
 83.  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Allots $16.8 Billion for EERE, U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY (Feb. 17, 2009), http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/daily.cfm/hp_news_id=156. 
 84.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DIRECT FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND 
SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL YEAR 2010 25–26 (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 
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private sector, which is better positioned to make efficient 
investments that meet consumers’ needs. 
2. Eliminate government programs to commercialize 
technologies 
The DOE has spent billions of research dollars to reduce CO2. 
Research dollars have gone towards energy-efficiency technologies, 
renewable energy sources, carbon capture and sequestration, clean-
coal technologies, nuclear energy, and alternative-energy vehicles.85 
All of these energy sources and technologies are available today, but 
they are not economical, whether due to burdensome regulations or 
simply because they are still prohibitively expensive. It is not the 
government’s role to force these technologies into the marketplace; 
thus, Congress should eliminate all DOE-funded commercial 
activities and focus on removing the onerous regulatory barriers that 
prevent energy technologies from reaching the market.86 Congress 
should focus on creating a more efficient system in which the private 
sector can use government resources, such as national laboratories. 
Congress should also create a structure that ensures government 
research meets national objectives, and is accessible to the private 
sector for application to economically viable endeavors. 
3. Eliminate LIHEAP  
LIHEAP is meant to help low-income households with energy 
costs, energy crises, and home weatherization,87 but it has rapidly 
expanded, is duplicative, and has been riddled with fraud and abuse. 
A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that 
the Department of Health and Human Services distributed funds to 
thousands of deceased and incarcerated people and claimed that 
LIHEAP application processors awarded funds to GAO officials 
using fake addresses and fake energy bills.88 Eliminating LIHEAP 
certainly does not mean that there will be no money to help low-
income households pay for energy costs. The federal government runs 
 
 85.  Nicolas Loris, Department of Energy Budget Cuts: Time To End the Hidden Green 
Stimulus, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2012/03/department-of-energy-budget-cuts-time-to-end-the-hidden-green-stimulus. 
 86. Id. 
 87.  About LIHEAP, OFFICE OF CMTY. SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/programs/liheap/about (last visited April 9, 2013). 
 88.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-621, LOW-INCOME HOME ENERGY 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: GREATER FRAUD PREVENTION CONTROLS ARE NEEDED 5–6 (2010), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10621.pdf. 
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more than seventy means-tested aid programs that provide cash for 
food, housing, medical care, and social services.89 Total federal and 
state spending on means-tested assistance to low-income persons 
exceeded $900 billion in 2011.90 Furthermore, cash, food, housing, and 
energy aid are highly fungible when they reach the household level, 
so households are in the best position to determine which good they 
need most. Congress should eliminate LIHEAP funding entirely. 
B. Tax Credits 
By uniquely favoring one industry, special tax treatment can 
serve the same purpose as a subsidy, and it has been an increasingly 
attractive way for the government to award preferential treatment to 
certain energy industries. The number of energy tax programs 
expanded from eleven in 1999 to thirty-eight in President George W. 
Bush’s 2007 budget.91 According to the EIA, tax expenditures 
comprise almost two-thirds of electricity subsidies.92 Ideally, Congress 
should immediately remove all distortionary energy tax policy—
meaning any tax policy that singles out an industry—and offset those 
repeals with a broad tax cut. In order to wean industries off 
preferential treatment and to not pull the rug out from companies 
that built their business around the expectation of receiving a tax 
credit, Congress should create a three-year window for expiration of 
all energy tax expenditures. This should not include broadly available 
tax deductions that apply across multiple sectors.93 Congress should 
not provide new targeted tax credits, should not extend sun-setting 
credits, should shorten the timeframe for which all targeted tax 
 
 89.  Katherine Bradley & Robert Rector, Confronting the Unsustainable Growth of Welfare 
Entitlements: Principles of Reform and Next Steps, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/06/confronting-the-unsustainable-growth-of-
welfare-entitlements-principles-of-reform-and-the-next-steps. 
 90.  Id. 
 91. MOLLY SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41227, ENERGY TAX POLICY: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AND CURRENT STATUS OF ENERGY TAX EXPENDITURES 8–9 
(2011). 
 92. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES IN 
ENERGY MARKETS 2007 xi (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy2/ 
pdf/subsidy08.pdf. 
 93.  For instance, some policymakers want to remove the manufacturer’s tax deduction for 
the oil and gas industry under section 199 of the Internal Revenue Code, which applies to all 
domestic manufacturers, including windmill and solar-panel manufacturers. For more 
information, see Nicolas Loris & Curtis Dubay, What’s an Oil Subsidy, THE HERITAGE FOUND. 
(May 12, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/whats-an-oil-subsidy. 
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credits are available, and should broadly lower the corporate income 
tax rate to prevent a tax increase. 
1. No new tax credits 
Congress should not implement any new tax credits for energy 
production, energy infrastructure, transportation (production and 
consumption), or energy-efficiency initiatives. This will prevent the 
federal government from continuing to pick winners and losers, and it 
will also ensure that Congress cannot use the tax code to direct 
investments. 
2. Force sun-setting tax credits to sunset 
One of the larger problems with targeted tax credits is that upon 
expiration, industry groups will lobby members of Congress to 
expand the credits for another year, or for multiple years. Congress 
should specify that any tax credit set to expire on December 31, 2013 
cannot be extended and should be accompanied with an offsetting tax 
reduction. 
3. Expedite sunsetting 
Congress should create a three-year window for all other tax 
credits that extend over multiple years or do not expire, and it should 
reduce the write-off percentage by one-third after each year. Any tax 
credit tied to production should follow the same schedule. This time 
frame will give industries a predictable window to lower costs and 
adjust to competition without federal aid. Congress should then 
reduce other taxes, such as the corporate income tax, by the amount 
of revenue that expediting the elimination of these unsound policies 
would raise. 
C. Make Immediate Expensing Available for Everyone 
Another way in which certain industries benefit over others 
relates to how companies can expense capital costs. For instance, oil 
and gas companies receive more generous treatment than other 
industries through expensing of intangible drilling costs.94 A simple 
solution is to allow all companies, including oil and gas companies, to 
be able to expense their full capital costs immediately. 
 
 94.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BUSINESS EXPENSES FOR USE IN PREPARING 2012 
RETURNS (2013),  available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p535/ch07.html#en_US_2012_ 
publink1000208883 (outlining deduction procedures for intangible drilling costs). 
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Immediate expensing allows companies to deduct the cost of 
capital purchases at the time they occur rather than deducting the 
costs over many years based on cumbersome depreciation schedules.95 
For instance, the Section 179 deduction in the Internal Revenue Code 
allows for immediate expensing of eligible property.96 Immediate 
expensing for all new plant and equipment costs—for any industry or 
type of equipment—would allow newer equipment to come online 
faster, which would improve energy efficiency and overall economic 
efficiency. 
D. Prevent and Remove Other Market Distortions 
The government distorts the energy market in several other 
ways—through loan guarantees, insurance programs, mandates, 
tariffs on imported energy, and energy sales at below-market costs. 
To eliminate these distortions, Congress should remove loan 
guarantee programs, privatize public power administrations, and 
restructure insurance for energy projects. 
1. Prohibit any new loan guarantees or other capital subsidy 
programs 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) included loan 
guarantees for nuclear power, and section 1705 of the ARRA 
amended EPAct to include loans for renewable energy, biofuel 
projects, and electric power transmission systems that began 
construction before October 1, 2011.97 Congress appropriated $6 
billion for the credit subsidy costs of the section 1705 loans.98 A new 
capital subsidy program gaining some traction in Congress is to create 
a Clean Energy Deployment Administration within DOE, which 
would act as a “green bank,” providing loans, loan guarantees, and 
clean-energy-backed bonds to carbon-free technologies that 
 
 95.  NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. BUS., SMALL BUSINESS TAX RATES AND TAX COMPLEXITY 
(2013), available at http://www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/research/cribsheets/small-
business-tax-rates-cribsheet.pdf. 
 96.  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ELECTING THE SECTION 179 DEDUCTION (2013), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p946/ch02.html#en_US_2012_publink1000107394 
(listing eligible property for deduction). 
 97.   Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 98.  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY LOAN PROGRAM 2 (2011), 
available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/recovery/documents/Innovative__Technology_ 
Loan_Guarantee_Program.pdf. 
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commercial lenders believe are too risky.99 But the DOE has no role 
to play as a banker.100 By subsidizing a portion of the actual cost of a 
project through a loan guarantee, the government is allocating 
resources away from more-valued uses to less-valued uses. In essence, 
these guarantees and loans direct labor and capital away from more 
competitive projects. This reduces the incentive for the energy 
investor or business to manage risk, innovate, and to increase 
efficiency, and it crowds out other innovative energy projects that do 
not receive loans. Venture capitalists are perfectly capable of making 
these investments and reaping the rewards from risk or suffering the 
losses from bad investments. Whether a company that receives a loan 
guarantee is profitable or insolvent, the program is a failure of a 
policy. No loan guarantee program should be expanded, nor should 
the government implement any new capital subsidy programs. 
2. Restructure public power  
Federal utilities, known as Power Marketing Administrations 
(PMAs), were set up to provide cheap electricity to rural areas.101 
PMAs can sell electricity at below-market rates because of favorable 
financing terms—they receive federal tax exemptions and receive 
loans at below-market interest rates.102 Construction, rehabilitation, 
operation, and maintenance of PMAs are financed through the main 
DOE budget, offset collections, alternative financing, and a 
reimbursable agreement with the Bureau of Reclamation.103 
Furthermore, rural electric cooperatives (RECs) are private 
organizations, in many cases non-profits, that provide about twelve 
percent of the nation’s electricity sales.104 RECs receive special tax 
 
 99.  Nicolas Loris & Jack Spencer, The Department of Energy Should Not Be the Green 
Banker, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2011/10/the-department-of-energy-should-not-be-the-green-banker. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  The DOE Power Marketing Administration is made up of the Southeastern Power 
Administration, the Southwestern Power Administration, the Western Area Power 
Administration, and Bonneville Power Administration. Department of Energy Offices. See 
Offices, DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/offices (last visited May 6, 2013) (listing the offices 
of members of the Power Marketing Administration). 
 102.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FEDERAL ENERGY MARKET INTERVENTIONS 1999: 
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION AND END USE 19, 22 (2000), available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/ 
servicerpt/subsidy1/pdf/sroiaf%282000%2902.pdf. 
 103.  Id. at 20. 
 104.  NAT’L RURAL ELEC. COOP. ASS’N, CO-OP FACTS & FIGURES (2012), available at 
http://www.nreca.coop/members/Co-opFacts/Documents/AnnualMeetingFactSheet.pdf. 
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exemptions and low-interest loans from the government.105 Congress 
should remove privileges for federal utilities, municipal power 
companies, and electricity cooperatives and, ultimately, sell off PMAs 
to private buyers. 
3. Restructure insurance and risk mitigation 
Several government programs offer liability-insurance schemes 
for specific industries. While some of these programs may have been 
justifiable in the past to protect private entities that engaged in high-
risk operations in support of vital national interests, they now often 
serve to subsidize insurance costs for private, profit-seeking 
industries.106 Two examples are the $75 million liability cap for 
offshore oil and gas operations and the Price-Anderson Act of 1957, 
which provides a liability structure for the nuclear industry that 
extends through 2025.107 Given the high probability of at least some 
frivolous lawsuits in pursuit of unlimited damages, removing the cap 
entirely without implementing a new system would subject covered 
industries to punitively high costs. Instead, Congress should reform 
liability caps, including reforming the Price-Anderson Act when it 
expires, in a way that accurately assigns risk and liability to those 
engaged in covered activities.108 
4. Eliminate production mandates 
When the federal tax credit for blending ethanol into gasoline 
and the fifty-four-cent-per-gallon tariff on imported ethanol expired, 
a diverse group of fiscal watchdogs, environmentalists, and free-trade 
proponents all hailed this as a major victory.109 Though this was a 
move in the right direction, the real burden on consumers and the 
environment is that producers will continue to blend ethanol into 
 
 105.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 84, at 22, 25. 
 106.  Anthony Heyes, Determining the Price of Price-Anderson, 25 REGULATION 26, 30 
(Winter 2002–03), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/ 
2002/10/v25n4-8.pdf.   
 107.  See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2006); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 
U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). 
 108.  For a comprehensive solution to offshore oil-spill liability, see Nicolas Loris, Jack 
Spencer & James Carafano, Oil Spill Liability: A Plan for Reform, THE HERITAGE FOUND. 
(Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/oil-spill-liability-a-plan-for-
reform. 
 109.  Nicolas Loris, Two Cheers for Ethanol Subsidies Expiring—But Costly Mandate 
Remains, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2012/01/ethanol-subsidies-expiring-but-the-costly-mandate-remains. 
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gasoline—because they are federally required to do so. EPAct 2005 
contained the first-ever requirement that renewable fuels be mixed 
into the gasoline supply.110 
The 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) 
substantially increased the mandated amount of renewable fuel 
required to be blended into transportation fuel to 36 billion gallons by 
2022. EISA mandated that 250 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol be 
blended into gasoline in 2011 and 500 million gallons be blended in 
2012.111 Thus far, zero gallons have been produced, because no 
companies have been able to produce commercially viable cellulosic 
ethanol.112 As a result, refiners had to pay more than $6 million in 
waiver credits or surcharges to comply with the EPA’s minimum 
volume requirements.113 Undoubtedly, refiners then pass these costs 
to the consumers. The EPA ratcheted down its goal for cellulosic 
biofuel production in 2012 to 8.65 million gallons—less than 2 percent 
of the original goal.114 The fact that cellulosic ethanol production is 
nowhere near providing industrial-scale quantities of fuel 
demonstrates the government’s inability to determine what is 
commercially viable and beneficial for consumers. 
V. THE CURIOUS TASK 
Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek wrote in The Fatal Conceit 
that “[t]he curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how 
little they really know about what they imagine they can design.”115 
For far too long, politicians have unsuccessfully attempted to 
demonstrate their ability to design and control the energy economy. 
The direct consequences, the unintended consequences, and the 
harmful effects on taxpayers, consumers, and the economy broadly 
 
 110. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 111. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–140, 121 Stat. 1492 
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 112.  Matthew Wald, A Fine for Not Using a Biofuel That Doesn’t Exist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/business/energy-environment/companies-face-fines-
for-not-using-unavailable-biofuel.html?_r=0. 
 113.  Fuels and Fuel Additives 2012 RFS2 Data, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/rfsdata/2012emts.htm (last updated Apr. 7, 2013); Jenny Mandel, 
Refiners Protest EPA’s “Ridiculous” Cellulosic Targets, GREENWIRE (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2011/06/22/5. 
 114.  Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: 2012 Renewable Fuel Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 
1320, 1320–1358 (Jan. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). 
 115. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, The Fatal Conceit, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK 76 
(W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988). 
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should serve as a wake-up call to free the market from distortions 
created by privileged treatment from the government. The discussion 
over the wind PTC extension provides valuable context to the larger 
energy-subsidy debate, and the same logic applied in this Article 
applies not only to the energy sector but to most sectors of the 
American economy. The task of preventing and removing subsidies 
from the energy economy is extremely difficult, but it is necessary. 
 
